

INTRODUCTION¹

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BACKGROUND AND AIMS OF THIS BOOK

The three editors of this book are all related to Kurt Danziger in different ways. I was a PhD student with him at York University in Toronto from 1988 to 1993 and we have stayed in regular contact ever since. Johann Louw is based at the University of Cape Town where Danziger is a regular visitor. Willem van Hoorn, who was Louw's PhD supervisor at the University of Amsterdam, is also a regular visitor to the University of Cape Town. The three of us came together out of a mutual admiration for Danziger's work.

When we began to discuss the possibility of producing a book on Danziger's work, we were agreed that we did not want to produce a 'Festschrift' in the traditional sense of the term. There is, of course, no harm in producing such a book but we thought that there could be no greater tribute to Danziger than to make his work the focal point for a variety of contributions representing several areas of active research in history and theory of psychology. Although in recent years productive scholarship has flourished in this field (Richards, 2002a), this situation is not reflected in the readily available literature.

There are few broad discussions of the current state of history and theory of psychology, as well as its problems and future directions. For obvious reasons, scholars in this field tend to focus on the limited aspect of the history of psychology that forms the topic of their research. The essays in this volume will go some way towards filling this gap. They range in scope from the role of history and theory of psychology in the discipline of psychology, the marginalization of cultural-historical approaches to psychology, historical psychology and its relationship to history and theory of psychology, the epistemological implications of critical history, the inclusion of parts of the world other than Europe and North America

in psychology's history, the future of academic disciplines and much more. As such, the essays in this volume can serve as a departure point for those who wish to acquaint themselves with some of the most important issues in the field.

KURT DANZIGER'S WORK

Kurt Danziger has had a long career in psychology, having been awarded his DPhil from the University of Oxford in 1952. The research for his dissertation involved standard 1940s laboratory experiments using rats (e.g. Danziger, 1953). He had already become critical of this kind of research while he was writing his dissertation and he subsequently began to do Piagetian-style research with children (e.g. Danziger, 1958). However, his interests moved towards social psychology during the 1950s and this area of psychology became his main research interest until the end of the 1970s. His work in this area includes a well-known study of the sociology of knowledge in South Africa (Danziger, 1963) and books on *Socialization* (Danziger, 1971) and *Interpersonal Communication* (1976). While much of this work is highly original and of continuing interest to researchers in this field (see Louw, this volume), the focus of this book is the work on history and theory of psychology that Danziger started to publish in 1979.

Danziger's switch to history and theory of psychology began when he had a sabbatical in academic 1973–74. He decided to use the sabbatical to acquaint himself with the original works of some of the important figures in the early history of psychology. His knowledge of German was an obvious advantage in this task as he read the work of Helmholtz, Fechner, Wundt, and many less prominent authors. Danziger compared his situation on reading these works to that of a subject in an Asch conformity experiment since the views that were being expressed in the original works of these authors bore little or no relationship to the views that had been traditionally attributed to them. At first, he wondered if he was misunderstanding these works but it became increasingly clear that there was a discrepancy between the primary and secondary sources (Brock, 1995a; 1995b).

It is difficult for those of us who were not involved in history and theory of psychology in the 1970s to imagine how undeveloped the field was at this time. Although history and theory of psychology had been an active area of pedagogy for many years, it had only become a recognized area of research in the United States in the late 1960s with the establishment of the American Psychological Association's Division 24 (Theoretical/Philosophical Psychology) and Division 26 (History of Psychology), as well as the Cheiron Society (International Society for the History of the Behavioral and Social Sciences), the *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* and the graduate program in history and theory of psychology at the University of New Hampshire (Ash, 1983; Brock, 1998). It was to be several more years before it became well established in other countries.

Danziger's move into history and theory of psychology in the early 1970s was a part of this wider trend.

The establishment of history and theory of psychology as an active area of research had several important consequences for the field. As Danziger's account of his reaction on reading the original works of important figures in the history of psychology shows, many historical 'facts' that had been merely taken for granted up to that point were challenged. Revisionist accounts of several important figures and events in the history of psychology began to appear and criticism of the standard accounts of psychology's history in the authoritative works by Boring (1950) and Allport (1985) was a central feature of what came to be known as 'critical history of psychology' (Danziger, 1984). Moreover, it was clear that the standard accounts of psychology's history helped to reinforce mainstream psychology and so revisionist history became a way of attempting to change the discipline itself.

Both of these points can be seen in what may be Danziger's best-known early work in this field, "The positivist repudiation of Wundt" (Danziger, 1979a). The standard view in American accounts up to that point was that the former student of Wundt, E. B. Titchener was a loyal disciple who had represented Wundt's views in the United States. This view had its origins in the text of Boring (1950) but Titchener's devotion to Wundt had been exaggerated even further by later writers (Brock, 1993). Danziger drove a wedge between the two by pointing out that Titchener had been influenced by the positivist epistemology of Mach, something that he had in common with Wundt's renegade student, Oswald Külpe who subsequently founded the Würzburg School. Danziger's account was based on sound historical scholarship but it can also be seen that he was enlisting Wundt's anti-positivist views in support of his own.

These themes were expanded in another article in the *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* in the following year, "The history of introspection reconsidered" (Danziger, 1980a). The title is taken from a paper by Boring titled, "The history of introspection" (Boring, 1953) and clearly shows Danziger's critical and revisionist aims. Another early work that deserves mention is a book chapter, "The social origins of modern psychology" that was published as part of a collection on 'sociology of psychological knowledge' since it shows the continuity between Danziger's early work on the sociology of knowledge in South Africa and his later historical and theoretical work (Danziger, 1963; 1979b; see also Louw, this volume). This chapter shows Danziger's familiarity with the sociology of science and includes a critique of the application of role theory in this area. A sociological orientation can also be seen in some of his later historical and theoretical work so that at times he has had to defend himself against the mistaken charge of 'sociological reductionism' (Danziger, 1992a; 1993a; see also Stam, this volume).

The years 1979/80 were important for the establishment of history and theory of psychology as a recognized sub-speciality within the discipline. According

to the traditional account of Boring (1950), the discipline of psychology could trace its origins to the establishment of Wundt's laboratory at the University of Leipzig in 1879. Psychologists as a whole are not generally interested in the history of their field but anniversaries are an exception to the rule and there was no bigger anniversary than the establishment of psychology itself. The American Psychological Association declared 1979 to be psychology's centennial year and the International Congress of Psychology, which is held every four years, moved to Leipzig in 1980 in order to commemorate the event. In spite of the dubious historical accuracy of this account, the anniversary provided many opportunities to publish historical work on Wundt and to have it widely read. Danziger contributed three chapters to two special volumes on the legacy of Wundt and an article in a special issue of *Psychological Research* that was devoted to Wundt (Danziger, 1980b; 1980c; 1980d; 1980e). As a result, he came to be regarded as one of the foremost Wundt-scholars in the field.

Danziger's work on Wundt declined sharply in quantity during the 1980s. I am aware of only two works on the subject that he published during this decade and both appear to have been commissioned (Danziger, 1983; 1988). Following the 'centennial' period, there was a change in Danziger's research interests towards psychological methodology and its history (e.g. Danziger, 1985a; 1985b). However, this interest was already apparent during the earlier period (Danziger, 1980e). The topic of methodology is central to psychology's history because of the theoretical divisions that became apparent in the early years of the discipline. The 1920s are sometimes characterized as 'the age of schools' and the theoretical diversity that existed was outlined by authors such as Woodworth (1931) and Heidbreder (1933). This kind of theoretical diversity is common in the human or social sciences, such as sociology, linguistics and anthropology, but psychologists were looking towards physics and the other natural sciences as a model for the discipline and described this situation as a 'crisis' (Driesch, 1926; Bühler, 1965; Vygotsky, 1985). It did not help the position of psychology in society since psychologists could hardly address the public from a position of authority if they could not agree among themselves. When psychology finally achieved some degree of unity after the Second World War, it was not on theoretical but on methodological grounds. A strict set of methodological rules was established in the United States and subsequently exported to other parts of the world. It was these methods that came to define the field.

The topic of 'mind' had been established for centuries as an object of philosophy and it was part of the discourse of society at large. Even 'behavior' could not be seen as the exclusive preserve of psychology since it was appropriated by a range of disciplines describing themselves as 'the behavioral sciences'. Therefore, the special contribution of psychology came to be defined not in terms of its subject matter but in terms of its methods. Even though many of these methods were unique to psychology (Winston, this volume), they were legitimated by an

appeal to 'science' and alternative methods were considered inferior at best and unacceptable at worst.

Danziger began his career as a psychologist shortly after the Second World War when these methodological prescriptions, and the intolerance of any alternatives to them, were at their height. With the sole exception of his early work with laboratory rats, Danziger had never felt bound by these strictures. His work with children used what has been called the 'clinical' method of Piaget and his work in the sociology of knowledge in South Africa had used non-traditional methods as well. He had always been critical of the primacy of method in mainstream psychology and sometimes used the term, 'methodolatry' to describe this situation. A useful introduction to Danziger's views on methodology is an article in *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, with the title, "The methodological imperative in psychology" (Danziger, 1985b).

However, when Danziger began to make psychological methodology the main focus of his historical research, his criticisms moved to a different level. This change crystallized around 1983 and eventually resulted in Danziger's best-known work, *Constructing the Subject: Historical Origins of Psychological Research* (Danziger, 1990). It is virtually impossible to summarize such a rich work in a few paragraphs but some of its most salient points will be briefly mentioned. For Danziger, the psychology experiment using human participants constitutes a social situation exemplifying various social regularities. He contrasts the situation in the early German experimental research of Wundt and others where the participant was described as a 'research participant' or 'observer', rather than a 'subject'. The role of the participant was at least as important as that of the experimenter, as may be seen from the fact that these roles were often interchangeable. In some cases, the role of the 'observer' was more important than that of the 'experimenter' and this situation is reflected in the fact that the former was sometimes a person of greater social status than the latter. An example of this occurs in the famous experiments of the Würzburg School in which the head of the institute, Külpe often acted as the 'observer' in the experiments of someone like Bühler, who was officially his assistant (Bühler, 1907; 1908). It could even happen that an experimental report was published not by the experimenter but by the 'observer'; something that would be unthinkable in standard modern research. The term for the research participant that eventually came to be adopted in standard experimental research, 'subject' is not to be found in any of this early experimental work. It had previously been used in medical work on hypnotism and reflects the unequal division of power that occurs in the hypnotic situation. Thus the adoption of this term by experimental psychologists reflects a change in the division of power between the researcher and the participant.

Throughout this work, Danziger shows that the way of doing experiments that subsequently became enshrined as the *only* valid way of doing an experiment is merely one of several possible alternatives. He also shows that psychology has

always used a variety of investigative practices, of which experiments are only one, and can trace its history not only to Wundt's laboratory but also to the clinical work of Charcot in France and the psychological testing that was done by Galton in England. The history of these investigative practices indicates a gradual narrowing of research possibilities over the years. Moreover, the methods that eventually came to be adopted were adopted mainly for extraneous reasons and not on strictly scientific grounds. Using the phrase, 'marketable methods', Danziger shows how psychologists adopted methods that would yield results that would be of interest to the social institutions that had an interest in prediction and control.

Danziger's work has its parallels in recent work in the interdisciplinary area of 'science studies' that encompasses history, philosophy, sociology, and even anthropology, of science. Much of this work implies a critique of the quasi-religious status that science has acquired in some quarters and examines it as a social product. While some historians, philosophers and sociologists in the field of science studies have a broader agenda, Danziger is more concerned with psychology itself. If the accepted methods of mainstream psychology lose their quasi-religious status, then they too can be open to debate and the possibility of alternatives can be discussed. This difference in emphasis seems to be acknowledged when Danziger says that his approach owes much to the field of science studies but suggests that he may "have produced a different kind of insider's history" (Danziger, 1990; p. vii).

Even before *Constructing the Subject* had appeared, there was a noticeable shift in Danziger's interests towards what he originally called 'the history of psychological concepts and categories' and later called 'the history of psychological objects'. Danziger first became interested in this topic when he was a visiting professor at Gadjah Mada University in Jogjakarta, Indonesia from 1957 to 1959. He went there as an employee of the Indonesian government with the specific mandate to introduce 'western' psychology to the curriculum. To his surprise, he found that he had an Indonesian colleague who was teaching a local form of psychology called, 'ilmu djiwa' that was based on Hindu philosophy. Danziger suggested that they conduct joint seminars in which the local and the 'western' views of psychology could be compared but the joint seminars never took place because they could not find a common set of 'objects' around which the seminars could be based. The local psychology had no equivalents for the basic objects of English-language psychology, such as 'motivation', 'intelligence', 'personality' etc., and there were no equivalents in English-language psychology for the objects that were central to the local psychology. This seemed to be clear evidence that psychological objects were social products (Danziger, 1997a; see also Brock, 1995a; 1995b).

Many other examples of this phenomenon could be given. A topic that has been explored in some detail is the Japanese emotion of 'amae'. This emotion is very important in Japanese culture and many popular Japanese songs are based on it. There is no equivalent in English, or indeed in any other European language, for this emotion and it seems to be a specifically Japanese way of feeling (Morsbach

and Tylor, 1976). It is, of course, possible for non-Japanese persons to gain some understanding of what the emotion is about but it would take several paragraphs to explain it rather than one word. The insight that these concepts, categories or objects—whatever term is preferred—are social products leads to the obvious conclusion that they have a history as well. Harré (1983) has pointed to the existence of the now obsolete emotion of ‘accidae’ which was important in medieval Europe and which was manifested by a neglect of one’s religious duties. Neglecting one’s religious duties is less important to modern Europeans and this may explain why the emotion is now obsolete. Danziger has focussed not on psychological objects that are now obsolete but on the historical origins of some of the most common objects of research in American psychology. In doing so, he has continued the process that he began in *Constructing the Subject* of historicizing aspects of psychology that are usually regarded as fixed and eternal. If the methods of psychology are viewed as sacred and not as social products that have a history, then this is even more true of the basic objects of psychological research.

Perhaps the first point that needs to be addressed is what exactly a ‘psychological object’ is in Danziger’s view. A key text in this regard is an article that Danziger published in *Annals of Theoretical Psychology* in 1993 under the title, “Psychological objects, practice, and history” (Danziger, 1993a). In this work, Danziger defines psychological objects in social terms: “They are simply the things that psychologists take to be their proper objects of investigation or professional practice” (p. 24). It therefore follows that psychological objects vary from place to place and in different historical periods. One psychological object that Danziger has not examined but which can serve as an example of this phenomenon is ‘stress’. This is now regarded as a major social problem in most developed countries and it is the object of a great deal of psychological research. However, until the middle of the twentieth century, the word had a purely physical meaning and referred to a force being exerted on a physical object. It has retained this meaning in terms such as ‘stress fracture’. It was only after this term was applied metaphorically to human psychology around the middle of the twentieth century that it came to be regarded as a suitable object of psychological research (e.g. Selye, 1978). Thus ‘stress’ became a psychological object after this period, whereas previously it was not.

Danziger’s main work on the history of psychological objects is his book, *Naming the Mind: How Psychology Found Its Language* (Danziger, 1997a). In this work, Danziger outlines the historical origins of several common objects of research in American psychology: behavior, learning, emotion, motivation, attitude, intelligence and personality. These are the kind of topics that might form the headings of the chapters in an American introductory text. Perhaps the most surprising result of this research is how ‘modern’ many of these concepts are. They are not much older than psychology itself. Although Danziger has tended to focus on psychological objects that were ultimately successful, he acknowledges that there have been failures as well. An example might be the ‘Bewußtseinslagen’ of

the Würzburg School, which have been mistranslated as ‘imageless thought’ but are more appropriately characterized as ‘states of consciousness’. Towards the end of the book, Danziger suggests that the psychological objects that are currently popular in American psychology will eventually fall out of favor and be replaced by others.

In spite of there being a literature on the history of scientific objects by historians of science (e.g. Canguilhem, 1955; Smith, 1991, Daston, 2000), there has been virtually no work on the history of psychological objects by psychologists. This may be the outcome of what Danziger calls ‘naïve naturalism’. This is the view that the current objects of English-language psychology correspond to some natural division of reality and can thus be regarded as ‘natural kinds’. In place of this view, Danziger has adopted the term, ‘human kinds’ from his colleague in Toronto, Ian Hacking (e.g. Hacking, 1995; see also Danziger, 1999). An important characteristic of human kinds is that they not only help us to understand and to explain human action. They influence the action as well. It is probably of no importance to a dolphin whether we characterize it as a ‘mammal’ or a ‘fish’ but it is of great importance to parents who physically punish their children whether we characterize their actions as ‘discipline’ or ‘child abuse’. One of the features of a human kind is that its application can sometimes be controversial. The person to whom it is applied can passively accept it or vigorously reject it. What both Hacking and Danziger want to emphasize here is the oft-stated view that human beings are ‘self-defining creatures’. It is because of this that the activities of psychologists differ from those of their counterparts in the natural sciences since they are not merely attempting to describe a human nature that exists independently of the descriptions that they use. Their descriptions help to shape the phenomenon under investigation and it is here that the relationship between psychological objects and social practices lies.

Danziger has sometimes been mistakenly characterized as a ‘sociological reductionist’ for holding these views (Stam, this volume). While he clearly wishes to demonstrate that knowledge has a sociological dimension, he makes no claim to knowing what the ultimate nature of psychological knowledge is. The issue is seen as an empirical question that has yet to be resolved:

Our only hope of establishing the reach of psychological knowledge is not to take its universality for granted at the outset, but to treat each of its products as a historically embedded achievement. Only when we understand something of this historical embeddedness of specific psychological objects and practices are we in a position to formulate intelligent questions about their possible transcendence. (Danziger, 1993a; p. 45)

Elsewhere, Danziger (1993b) suggests that trying to decide on these issues in advance of carrying out any historical or cross-cultural research is like trying to judge the outcome of a court case before the evidence has been produced. He has

also written positively of the critical realism of Roy Bhaskar (Danziger, 1990; see also Bhaskar, 1978; 1979). According to Richards (2002b), this philosophy “attempts to recoup the implications of social constructionism by accepting that the objects of knowledge are objectively real, but conceding that the terms in which they are known or knowable are in some sense socially determined” (p. 334). Thus the sociology of knowledge and philosophical realism are not incompatible, as is often supposed. The history of psychological objects as an area of historical research is compatible with a wide range of philosophical views and Danziger’s realist position is only one possibility among several. However, it does need to be emphasized that when Danziger asserts that psychological objects are intimately related to the social practices of a particular time and place, he is referring to real social practices that have real effects on real people and not to some figment of our imagination.

Danziger has continued this line of research with his most recent work on the history of memory. This was a topic that he initially considered for inclusion in *Naming the Mind* but he came to realise that it was so vast that it needed a separate treatment (Danziger, personal communication). This work marks an important departure from the psychological objects that were examined in *Naming the Mind* in one very important respect: the concept of ‘memory’ is not a recent creation but has existed in one form or another since at least the time of Plato. According to Danziger (2002), the appearance of this term is connected with the social practice of storing information in written form. Plato’s teacher, Socrates wrote nothing and relied on oral communication. It is no mere coincidence, therefore, that Plato introduced the concept with the metaphor of a wax tablet since it has always been linked to storing information in one form or another (see also Draaisma, 2000). The persistence of the concept can be explained in terms of the persistence of this social practice.

Danziger also shows that there have been wildly different conceptions of the phenomenon over time and he has recently returned to the topic of Wundt in order to illustrate this point. It is well known that Wundt did not carry out any memory experiments in his Leipzig laboratory. The start of experimental research on this topic is usually traced to the work of Ebbinghaus in Berlin (Ebbinghaus, 1885). This situation is often explained in purely technical terms; that is, Wundt did not develop the appropriate experimental techniques. Underlying this assumption is the view of naïve naturalism that memory has always been ‘out there’ and was merely waiting for someone to investigate it. According to Danziger (2001a), Wundt did not regard the topic of ‘memory’ as being of fundamental importance since, in his view, it was not one mental activity but the secondary product of several. It was a category of folk psychology—or what Wundt sometimes called, ‘vulgar psychology’—and he dismissed it as an ‘empty name’; that is, a word that had no proper referent. Wundt was not the only person in nineteenth-century Germany who held these views and they would not have appeared strange to Wundt’s contemporaries.

Danziger has only published a small amount on this subject so far but it is already clear that he does not regard an apparently ‘transhistorical’ psychological object, such as memory, as being unaffected by socio-historical circumstances.

THE CHAPTERS

Some readers may be surprised by the use of ‘history’ and ‘theory’ throughout this introduction since these are sometimes seen as separate activities. This is particularly true in the United States where the American Psychological Association has separate divisions for these activities, Divisions 26 (History of Psychology) and 24 (Theoretical/Philosophical Psychology) respectively. This situation stands in sharp contrast to the institutional arrangements in the British and Canadian professional organizations, which have sections devoted to “History and Philosophy of Psychology”. Danziger is a philosophically minded historian of psychology who has been a frequent participant not only in the meetings of these two sections but also in the meetings of the International Society for Theoretical Psychology. He has also published his work in journals such as *Theory and Psychology*, *Annals of Theoretical Psychology* and even *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* (e.g. Danziger, 1985; 1993a; 1994). In an interview that I conducted with him in 1994, he expressed the view that history without theory cannot be good history and that theory without history cannot be good theory (Brock, 1995a; 1995b). He has recently returned to this topic in a book chapter titled, “Where history, theory and philosophy meet: The historiography of psychological objects” (Danziger, 2003). As may be evinced from the title of this chapter, Danziger’s work exemplifies this unified approach to history, theory and philosophy. Although Danziger’s philosophical interests are evident in his historical work, he prefers to use the term, ‘theory’; partly in order to distinguish it from that branch of philosophy called, ‘philosophy of mind’ or ‘philosophical psychology’ (Danziger, personal communication).

While the authors in this volume may differ in their views on how ‘history’ and ‘theory’ might be related, they are all united in the view that these activities should not be treated as distinct. Two of the authors in this book were the editors of a special issue of *Annals of Theoretical Psychology* that was devoted to exploring this relationship and two others contributed articles to this special issue (van Rappard & van Strien, 1993; Danziger, 1993a; Staeuble, 1993).

Hank Stam is well known for his contributions to both history and theory of psychology and as the editor of the journal, *Theory and Psychology*. He is therefore well qualified to discuss the theoretical implications of Danziger’s work. As mentioned in the previous section, one aspect of this work that has been the object of much discussion in theoretical circles is its epistemological implications. While Danziger rejects charges of ‘sociological reductionism’ and regards himself as a philosophical realist, some psychologists have the impression that ‘reality’ is being glossed over or left out of his account. In this chapter, Stam argues that such

charges are unwarranted and that Danziger's epistemological views can be better understood if 'history' is taken as the departure point for these views rather than 'psychology' as it usually understood.

The chapter by Johann Louw examines what is chronologically the earliest work. Danziger's South African research exemplifying a sociology of knowledge approach provides some interesting links with his later historical work. As Louw points out, Danziger has continued to be a sociologically oriented historian of psychology and not just in his account of the 'peripheral' aspects of psychology, such as the history of psychologists and institutions. His sociological analysis extends to psychological knowledge itself and, although his work is generally characterized as 'history and theory of psychology', it can be seen as an exercise in the sociology of knowledge as well. Danziger's work is sometimes identified with what has come to be known as "The social constructionist movement in modern psychology" (Gergen, 1985). However, his sociologically oriented history of psychology has its roots in the much older tradition of the sociology of knowledge. He has suggested that it is more appropriate to regard the area of 'social construction' as an interdisciplinary field and that placing the suffix 'ism' on the end of this term can only raise false expectations about the amount of agreement that exists between the researchers from a variety of disciplines who work in this area (Danziger, 1997b).

Like Danziger, Andrew Winston has been working on the history of psychological methodology since the 1980s. They are also familiar with each other's work and there may have been some mutual influence since their research has overlapped. One topic that both have examined is the introduction of the concept of 'variable' into psychology (e.g. Winston & Blais, 1996; Danziger & Dzinis, 1998). Far from being a timeless and universal feature of science, the term was adopted by American psychologists in the 1930s and subsequently exported to other parts of the world. Winston also shows quite clearly that the term is a part of the internal culture of psychology and is hardly used in physics and other natural sciences. This work on the 'variable' concept is a good example of how the history of psychological methodology and the history of psychological objects can overlap. Winston also provides an account of a psychological object that died a very quick death: the 'experimentee'. The term was proposed by Saul Rosenzweig in the 1930s but he decided to abandon it following pressure from E. G. Boring. What is particularly interesting about this account is the importance that was placed on the homogeneity of the methodological terms that were used within the discipline.

Pieter van Strien develops a different aspect of *Constructing the Subject* in his chapter on the single-subject research design. In his own work, Danziger had focussed on the historical origins of mainstream American research methods. One of the main features of these methods is that they take a large sample of 'subjects' and then work with the statistical averages from these results. This is equally true of experimental research that is interested in general human performance and in personality research where individual differences are the main focus of interest. Danziger described this situation as "the triumph of the aggregate" and

shows how the early German experimenters based their theories on evidence drawn from one participant or a small number of participants (Danziger, 1990). One of the most famous examples is Ebbinghaus who was both the subject and the experimenter in his memory research (Ebbinghaus, 1885). Danziger acknowledges that the single-subject research design has continued in psychophysics and van Strien expands these remarks. He also points out that the design has continued in other areas of psychology as well. Perhaps the best-known example is B. F. Skinner who frequently used a single animal in his research. Van Strien also refers to computer modelling, which belongs to a historical period that is later than the period that Danziger discusses in *Constructing the Subject*. The chapter provides an interesting extension of Danziger's work to other investigative practices. Van Strien acknowledges that psychologists like Skinner who did single-subject research were out of step with the majority of American psychologists and it is the methods of this majority that were the focus of Danziger's research. He also suggests that the persistence of the single-subject design can be explained in sociological terms.

Richard Walsh-Bowers is a former student of Danziger whose work in recent years has centered on research ethics and the social aspects of the research situation. The latter is an important focus of *Constructing the Subject* where Danziger had drawn attention to the research relationship in the early German experiments, which was a relationship of equals and sometimes a relationship in which the research participant had greater social status than the experimenter. It was only later that research participants came to be described as 'subjects', who had to be naïve and who were deliberately kept naïve by using deception and other strategies. Walsh-Bowers' aim is to introduce a greater degree of equality and democracy in the research situation and his chapter provides a good example of how critical history is often written with the aim of changing the present.

Following the publication of *Constructing the subject*, Danziger addressed a broad set of themes related to the historiography of psychology. In 1992, he presented a paper at a meeting of Cheiron-Europe titled, "In praise of marginality" (Danziger, 1992b). The paper discussed several aspects of marginality but perhaps the most important was the problematic status of history and theory of psychology in relation to psychology. This theme is taken up by Betty Bayer in her discussion of the prospects of a cultural-historical approach to psychology. Her work also touches on a theme that Danziger (1994) addresses in his paper, "Does the history of psychology have a future?". In this paper, Danziger suggested that it is important for critical historians to maintain a presence within psychology, and within science in general, so that they will be in a better position to have their views heard. Historians of science work in different departments from practising scientists, go to different conferences and publish in different forums. This is not an ideal position to be in if one wishes to influence the course of science. Bayer offers a somewhat depressing picture of scholars being hounded out of their academic disciplines and being forced to do their work elsewhere. Those who identify with critical

history will surely have different experiences in this regard but Bayer does end with an optimistic assessment of the prospect of change. Her chapter points to the importance of interdisciplinary work and interdisciplinary alliances. For those of us who take a sociological and historical perspective on these matters, disciplines are not 'natural kinds' that correspond to some natural division in the world but the product of social conventions that vary historically and cross-culturally. Even the label, 'psychologist' is a 'human kind' that one can accept or reject; or accept with qualifications.

The inclusion of Hans van Rappard in this volume is an indication of the editors' intentions of producing a critical discussion of Danziger's work. Van Rappard is well known as a critic of Danziger's approach to the history of psychology (van Rappard, 1997; 1998). In this chapter, van Rappard discusses the work of Wundt, a topic that was central to Danziger's early work in history and theory of psychology, and seeks to highlight what he considers to be the differences between the general approach of Danziger and that of his own. Van Rappard has criticised the trend among historians of psychology towards 'critical' history and he correctly views Danziger as one of the most prominent representatives of this approach. According to van Rappard, the most appropriate kind of work that a psychologist-historian (as opposed to a professional historian) can do is to examine the great theorists of the past in order to assist current theorizing and he offers his account of Wundt as an example of this approach. What complicates the situation considerably is that Danziger himself has used a similar approach in his discussions of Wundt's *Völkerpsychologie* (Danziger, 1983) or Lewin's early research in Berlin, which he has described as "buried treasure" (Danziger; 1990; p. 178). There is nothing inconsistent about being critical of mainstream psychology while simultaneously looking for alternatives among approaches to the subject that were historically less successful. Indeed, it could be argued that one is a necessary complement to the other in North America where to use the works of the past as a guide to the present is already a highly unorthodox step. While reading van Rappard's critique of Danziger's views on the history of psychology, and also that of Dehue (1998), it should be remembered that these Dutch authors work in a different social context from that of Danziger since this may explain some of the differences in their views.

One example of these local differences is the different status of historical psychology in (continental) Europe and the English-speaking world (Brock, 1995a; 1995b). Historical psychology has been an important theme in Danziger's recent work, though he was aware of its significance at an early stage (see Louw, this volume). This subject has long existed on the margins of English-language psychology (e.g. Barbu, 1960) but it is taken much more seriously in Germany (e.g. Loewenstein, 1992; Sonntag & Jütteman, 1993) and in the Netherlands (e.g. Verhave & van Hoorn, 1984; Peeters, 1996). Willem van Hoorn is a former student of Jan Hendrik van den Berg, a psychiatrist who represents a distinctive phenomenological approach to historical psychology (van den Berg, 1961), and he

has been engaged with this field for many years. His chapter is a plea for the inclusion of historical psychology as an integral part of the historiography of scientific psychology through the phenomenological concept of the 'life world'.

Irmingard Staeuble has been a prominent figure in the recent work on historical psychology in Germany (e.g. Staeuble, 1991; 1993). She is also well known as a critic of the postcolonial relationship between the so-called 'first' and 'third' worlds in psychology and has argued for a greater openness to non-western conceptions of knowledge. In this respect, her interests overlap with Danziger's own. It was Danziger's encounter with an alien form of psychological knowledge in Indonesia that led to his interest in the history of psychological objects. He has also criticized the unfortunate tendency to identify the history of American psychology with the history of psychology as a whole and has advocated what he calls a 'polycentric' approach to the field (Danziger, 1991; 1996). In this chapter, Staeuble outlines the expansion of western psychology around the world after the Second World War and the attempts to make it more appropriate to the local context under the label, 'indigenization' (e.g. Moghaddam, 1987). She also discusses the prospects of the kind of polycentric history of psychology that Danziger has outlined.

The book ends with a chapter by Kurt Danziger himself. This chapter contains comments on the chapters by the other authors and also a discussion of some of the issues that these chapters raise. One topic that Danziger explores in some detail is the issue of 'disciplinarity'. Psychologists have traditionally identified their work with the natural sciences and neglected the subject's links to the social sciences and humanities (Danziger, 1994; Brock, 1995a; 1995b). As Danziger points out, the situation is maintained by erecting barriers to subjects like sociology, anthropology, history and philosophy and one possible strategy for changing the situation is to move outside this disciplinary ghetto and to participate in interdisciplinary ventures.

NOTE

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