ditional idealism/realism distinction is ill suited to capture Husserl’s position” (p. 17). Mensch regards Husserl’s career as a “motivated path” (p. 213) whose main ligne de force is the problem of the objectively valid knowledge. In Mensch’s view, Logical Investigations does not offer a satisfactory account of the relationship between ideal and real contents of judgments. It is by interpreting ideal meanings not as “objects of reference” but rather as “referring functions” (p. 216) that one can understand why an ideal intentional content is, from the outset, intersubjective.

Due to its highly technical phenomenological terminology, Husserl’s “Logical Investigations” Reconsidered might scare away the neophytes. However, it would remain a valuable guide for those who want to explore one of the crucial philosophical works in the philosophy of the twentieth century.

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Like so many other psychological categories, “emotion” is a relatively recent historical invention. The term can be found in some eighteenth-century texts, but only in the course of the nineteenth century is it generally adopted to refer to “a set of morally disengaged, bodily, non-cognitive and involuntary feelings,” a working definition used by Thomas Dixon in exploring the historical emergence of the modern category of emotion.

In a series of closely argued and well-documented chapters, Dixon shows that this category had no equivalent in earlier discourse. “Affections,” for example, encompassed rational variants, and the venerable concept of the “passions of the soul” was profoundly different from emotions in its strong moral connotations. Dixon makes the important point that the meaning of all psychologically significant concepts derives from their embeddedness in networks of related concepts. In traditional usage, “passions” were part of a discursive web in which “sin,” “self-love,” “conscience,” and so on, played crucial roles. “Emotion,” however, quickly became part of a morally neutral discourse that linked it to such concepts as “organism,” “organ,” “bodily expression,” and so on. As a result, the domain of phenomena covered by “emotion” is not at all the same as that covered by the older “passion.” Dixon clearly demonstrates that “emotion” constitutes a specifically modern discursive construction rather than an analogue of some ancient psychological category.

Because one is dealing with a network of interconnected categories, historical changes can only be understood in terms of the shifting relationships among them. The change from passion to emotion implicated concomitant changes in the understanding of several other categories—will, reason, and desire, in particular. Dixon presents a superb analysis of the interrelationship between the historical fate of the will and the passions. He pays less attention to changes in the meaning of rationality, especially the instrumentalization of reason, and to the new, quasi-biological understanding of individual desire.
This is partly due to the legitimate restriction of his analysis to the English language literature where the origins of “emotion” can be traced to the naturalistic mental philosophy of Scottish writers, especially Hume and Thomas Brown. The nineteenth-century reconstruction of psychological categories was accomplished on this foundation, but it also depended on the tripartite division of cognition, affect, and conation imported from Germany. Dixon recognizes this but limits himself to exploring only specific aspects of this line of historical development.

Instead, he deals very fully with the way in which Brown’s purely mental understanding of “emotion” was converted into a psycho-physical category in the subsequent work of Bain, Spencer, and Darwin. His account culminates in William James’s appropriation of this physicalized category for the nascent discipline of psychology, a move that assisted the rhetorical affiliation of psychology with the natural sciences.

Dixon regards the emergence of the modern category of emotion as part of a secularization process that affected the entire network of categories used to classify and conceptualize human experience and conduct. But he also insists that the historiography of psychology ought not to limit itself to providing an account of such dominant trends. There were oppositional tendencies whose less physicalist and more cognitive interpretation of “emotion” deserves to be rescued from historical oblivion.

Measured against the sharper, more differentiated analysis presented in this book, the conventional understanding of “emotion” begins to look like a very blunt instrument. Dixon’s contribution is not “merely” historical; it has considerable relevance for contemporary attempts to achieve a richer conceptualization of affective life.

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Created by academic social scientists during the 1950s and 1960s, modernization theory provided the dominant American framework for thinking about postcolonial nations by promoting the belief that such countries would achieve “modernity” on the model of the United States. Its close connection to state policy making and access to private foundation money made modernization theory far more consequential than most social scientific paradigms, while making its mandarin proponents vulnerable to the charge that they were ideological servants of American power. Nils Gilman points out that modernization theory thrived in a Cold War context, as it promised to explain how the United States could help third-world countries achieve a capitalist modernity that would inoculate them from the threat of Communist takeover. Yet, Mandarins of the Future is original precisely because it does not explain modernization theory by its Cold War context alone.