
In this book Martin Kusch, whose earlier books were devoted to such subjects as the philosophy of language, Foucault’s methodology, and the debate about “psychologism” in the history of philosophy, turns his attention to topics of more direct interest to psychologists. The major part of the book is devoted to a fine-grained analysis of controversies that developed in Germany early in the twentieth century around the attempts by members of the Würtzburg School to study thought processes experimentally. To this is appended a philosophical discussion of much more recent controversies about the nature of “folk psychology.” Important contributions to the history of psychology are to be found in the main part of the book.

First of all, Kusch’s book is important because he rescues from historical oblivion an episode which American texts tend to recognize only in the form of a caricature known as the “imageless thought controversy.” But the relationship of the “imageless thought” story to what was really at stake in the Würzburg experiments is analogous to the perspective that Rosencrantz and Guildenstern had on the events at Elsinore. It was the perspective of individuals at the periphery of the action. In the case of the Würzburg experiments, the action was in Germany and what was at stake was nothing less than the nature and role of psychological knowledge. Kusch limits himself to the very extensive German literature that grew up around the work done at Würzburg, paying special attention to Wundt as the key antagonist whose psychological vision was fundamentally at odds with new directions in the discipline. The Würzburgers’ contributions were controversial because of their implications for issues that went far beyond any purely empirical or technical questions. In successive chapters, Kusch discusses the implications for the nature of psychological experiments, for the relationship between psychology and disciplines such as physiology and logic, for positions in social and political philosophy, and for religious positions. In doing so, he provides a superb
secondary source for a large volume of material that was never translated into English but which is nevertheless of great significance for the history of psychology in Europe.

Although the book can be read as a useful source of historical information, the author sees it as a case study for the application of theoretical insights derived from the Edinburgh variety of reductive sociologism that he favors. This introduces a level of abstract theorizing that is often at odds with the richness of the historical material. As a result of the static nature of the sociological model there is a tendency to overestimate the degree of cognitive consistency and to underestimate the internal tensions that characterized the positions taken by key historical actors.

Fortunately, one of the most pleasing aspects of this book is the author’s readiness to point out historical facts that seem to be at variance with his specific sociological hypotheses and to acknowledge the limitations of the latter. This means that both the reader whose interests are primarily in the sociology of science and the reader whose interests are primarily in the history of science are likely to find the book illuminating.

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Few things more clearly divide “scholarly” and “popular” history of science than their respective treatments of the moment of “discovery.” Here the demythologizing activity of the historian is at its most obvious. But if historians success in showing that “Eureka!” experiences are vanishingly few, does this mean that the whole notion of discovery must be discarded? The response in this book is a firm “no”: Accounts of “discovery” say much about the epistemology, rhetoric, and poetics of science and, more specifically, the discourse of historians of science. The same issues exist, I think, in the natural and human sciences, but these studies remain with the human sciences; nor do they make links with the relevant English-language literature in the sociology of scientific knowledge.

The subtitle of the book refers to two celebrated, indeed archetypical adventures of discovery: the deciphering of Egyptian hieroglyphs and the unconscious. Sophie-Anne Leterrer’s essay on Jean-François Champollion is indeed a lucid example of the historian’s craft, using the detailed record to describe the long gestation and difficult birth of a brilliant child, rather than the sudden, even apocalyptic, insight that popular belief has favored. Jean-Yves Pautrat’s chapter on Boucher de Perthes’s “discovery” of prehistory in the gravels at Abbeville illustrates the same points equally clearly. It is more difficult to say anything new about Freud. Here the analyst Jean-François Chiantaretto comments on the differences between Freud’s 1914 polemic on the history of psychoanalysis and his later autobiographical essay, showing how each has a distinct purpose and rhetoric. In their “Postface,” however, the editors...